

EVALUATING ARMY AVIATION'S FORCE STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE FORCE

BY

COLONEL THOMAS H. STAUSS
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 21-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Evaluating Army Aviation's Force Structure to Support an Operational Reserve Force				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Thomas H. Stauss				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel John F. Laganelli Center for Strategic Leadership Director, AWC Support Branch				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT After nearly nine years of persistent conflict in OEF and OIF, and no clear picture of the future, the Army has operated at a demanding pace and while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance. The overall demand for Army forces, especially Army aviation assets, continues to exceed a sustainable rate. The Army has determined that it must rely on an operational force to meet the demands of today and tomorrow's national strategic environment. Although the Reserve component (RC) has played a pivotal role in providing substantial support and proven themselves a capable and reliable force multiplier, is operationalizing the RC the right answer. More importantly, to face the current and next threat, what is the right mix of equipment to meet the task? This SRP will analyze the operational force concept and apply it to Army aviation force structure to see where assets may be more capable and where they can provide the most impact. It concludes with recommendations to change the RC mission to meet its constitutionally-rooted, dual-role requirements, and change to force structure within Army aviation to better utilize assets.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reserve Component, Homeland Security, ARFORGEN, Equipping					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNLIMITED	28	

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**EVALUATING ARMY AVIATION'S FORCE STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT
AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE FORCE**

by

Colonel Thomas H. Stauss
United States Army

Colonel John Laganelli
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Thomas H. Stauss

TITLE: Evaluating Army Aviation's Force Structure to Support an Operational Reserve Force

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 21 March 2011 WORD COUNT: 5,519 PAGES: 28

KEY TERMS: Reserve Component, Homeland Security, ARFORGEN, Equipping

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After nearly nine years of persistent conflict in OEF and OIF, and no clear picture of the future, the Army has operated at a demanding pace and while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance. The overall demand for Army forces, especially Army aviation assets, continues to exceed a sustainable rate.

The Army has determined that it must rely on an operational force to meet the demands of today and tomorrow's national strategic environment. Although the Reserve component (RC) has played a pivotal role in providing substantial support and proven themselves a capable and reliable force multiplier, is operationalizing the RC the right answer. More importantly, to face the current and next threat, what is the right mix of equipment to meet the task? This SRP will analyze the operational force concept and apply it to Army aviation force structure to see where assets may be more capable and where they can provide the most impact. It concludes with recommendations to change the RC mission to meet its constitutionally-rooted, dual-role requirements, and change to force structure within Army aviation to better utilize assets.

EVALUATING ARMY AVIATION'S FORCE STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE FORCE

Who would have imagined that the United States would be committed to a two theater war and remain in an era of persistent conflict, surely not the Framers of our Constitution or Senior Military Leaders through the previous 30 years? However, after nearly nine years of conflict and no clear picture of the future, the Army has operated at a demanding pace and while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance.¹ Even with the Reserve Components (RC) contributing greatly in support of the on-going war, the overall demand for Army forces continues to exceed a sustainable rate, especially with Army aviation assets.

The Army has determined that it must rely on an operational force to meet the demands of today and tomorrow's environment. On October 29, 2008, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issued Department of Defense (DoD) Directive, #1200.17, establishing a set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the RC as an operational force. His intent was to ensure the RC is manned and equipped to integrate, when necessary, with the Active Component (AC) to provide additional operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet defense requirements. Furthermore, the Secretary identified the AC and RC as being integrated as a total force and established homeland defense as a total force requirement.²

In view of recent operations, specifically OIF and OEF, the RC has provided substantial support and proven they are a capable and reliable force multiplier, adding to the total force success. They achieved this while suffering through significant shortages of equipment and through the use of cross-leveling personnel among units to fill vacancies. Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG H. Steven Blum, confirmed that

in September 2001 the ARNG had less than 75 percent of its equipment “on hand.” In 2006, that number reached a low of 35 percent.³ Although today the percentage is not nearly that low, there are still equipment shortages. While the total force is strained to provide equipment to two theaters, the lack of equipment and slow pace of equipment modernization has significantly affected RC availability. These problems are most prevalent in RC aviation units, specifically AH-64 Apache-equipped Attack Helicopter Battalions. For example, there are currently fifteen AC AH-64 Apache battalions, two U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Apache battalions, and eight Army National Guard (ARNG) Apache battalions. Of the eight ARNG battalions, four are currently modernizing from the AH-64 A model to the AH-64D model, which is taking up to three years to equip and deploy in support of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)⁴ model requirements. The RC fielding and training delays have exacerbated an already high AC Apache battalion deployment tempo.

Besides the positive aspect Directive #1200.17 provides in modernizing the RC, are there negative aspects from this Directive? Will the Directive increase mission load or demand more operational requirements of the ARNG? Has the Directive taken into account the ARNG’s state obligation and homeland security responsibilities? Are we asking too much of the ARNG to perform a dual-role of federal missions and support individual state governors? Should the RC be focused on or used exclusively for homeland defense? In light of current economic struggles, defense budget cuts, and increasing threats to homeland security, is transforming the RC to an operational force necessary or justified?

The purpose of this study is to analyze the operational force concept and apply it to Army aviation force structure to see where assets of the ARNG may be more capable and where they can provide the most impact. It will include a review of the origin and historical role of the military, consider homeland security and disaster relief responsibilities, ARFORGEN responsibilities, equipping the ARNG, and propose recommendations to better structure aviation within the ARNG to fulfill their dual-role requirements.

U.S. Military Origins

To properly analyze the operational force concept and recommend changes, you must first understand the Army's collective origin. Since the inception of the Army in the Articles of Confederation, 1777, and during the Federal Convention in 1787, the Constitution Framers' plan was to augment a small active duty force with the militia (National Guard) and Army Reserve for enduring conflicts or emergencies.⁵

The Army claims its roots to the "Continental Army" of 1775 before the establishment of the United States. After the revolutionary war, the Congress of the Confederation created the "Regular Army of the United States" to replace the disbanded Continental Army. Today, the more than 500,000 strong Active Army is the country's permanent, full-time component and is augmented by more than 500,000 part-time ARNG and USAR forces.⁶ While the Army's structure has changed and evolved through time to meet emerging threats, its purpose has remained the same; to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests and fulfill national military responsibilities.⁷ Through numerous AC reorganizations and restructuring the largest

variable has been manpower, from a low of 80 Soldiers in 1784 to nearly 2 million at the height of World War II to over 700,000 Soldiers in the 1980s.

The National Guard claims roots back as far as 1636 when they marched as militia in support of the English Colonies in North America. Also known as citizen soldiers, organized to provide their own local defense they also maintained an allegiance to individual colonies and later states. Following the revolutionary war, the Framers of the Constitution empowered Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia."⁸ Additionally, the Constitution provides for the National Guard to be called up for federal active duty in times of Congressional sanctioned war or national emergencies.

The Militia Act of 1903 organized the various state militias into the present National Guard and increased the role as a reserve force for the U.S. Army.⁹ Prior to entering World War I in 1917, the National Defense Act of 1916 further expanded the role of the National Guard in national defense even though it remained a state force.¹⁰ By mid-1918 the War Department changed the designation of all land forces to one "United States Army." Following World War I and the passing legislation of the National Defense Act of 1920, the Army was demobilized and the act established the broad framework for the Army's structure. It outlined three components of the Army: the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves.¹¹ Entering World War II and through the Vietnam conflict, the components were again combined, and later separated at the conclusion of the conflict.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam Conflict and the suspension of the draft, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams adopted the Total Force Policy of

1973. Along the same principles of the combined Army of the United States, the Total Force Policy was an effort to create more force structure to an all volunteer force to make extended operations possible. The policy called for the U.S. to maintain an active duty force capable of maintaining peace and deterring aggression. Those forces would be reinforced, when necessary, by a well-trained, well-equipped reserve component. The effect of an all-volunteer active Army and the Total Force Policy was a shift of some responsibilities and resources to the RC.¹² As a result, the ARNG missions, equipment, and training opportunities increased more than ever before.¹³

Since the end of Desert Storm, the ARNG has been called upon and participated in numerous crises to include Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to these Federal requirements, the ARNG maintains their State missions; responding to large riots, natural disasters, and state security issues. Today's National Guard still continues a dual state-federal force, providing their states with units trained and equipped to protect life and property, while providing to the nation units trained, equipped, and ready to defend the United States and its interests, around the globe.¹⁴

The Army Reserve claims lineage from 1908 when military legislation was passed establishing the third component in addition to the Regular Army and the National Guard.¹⁵ The original purpose was to provide a federal reserve of medical officers to the Army and was briefly known as the Organized Reserve consisting of the Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps. After World War II it became the Army Reserve. Unlike their Active Component counterparts, Reserve Soldiers, like the National Guard, perform only part-time duties. RC Soldiers maintain a civilian occupation and typically attend training one weekend per month with annual training

requirements for two continuous weeks sometime during the year. Unlike the National Guard that provides combat arms units and related combat support units, the Army Reserve has adhered to their roots and is comprised of only combat support and combat service support units.¹⁶

As the Constitution Framers created “checks and balances” to provide a balance throughout the government, the military is no different. The primary difference between the ARNG and the USAR is the level of government which they are initially responsible to. The ARNG is subordinate to their state’s government while the USAR is subordinate to the federal government. In essence this unique relationship provides a balance against the standing federal army, which early Americans feared would threaten state’s rights.

Homeland Security

Homeland security is an umbrella term for security efforts to protect the United States against terrorist activity. Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), homeland security activities were spread across more than 40 federal agencies.¹⁷ The original recommendation to create a National Homeland Security Agency was presented in February 2001 by two former senators; Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH) in their report, “Road Map for National Security.” The new agency would have responsibility to consolidate and refine the missions of the different departments and agencies that had a role in U.S. homeland security.

One month after September 11, 2001, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), using similar language, introduced a bill to establish the Department of National Homeland Security. The bill intended to unite the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the

Customs Service, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection in a Cabinet-level department. On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 into law, creating the Department of Homeland Security.¹⁸ Homeland Security is officially defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur".¹⁹ DHS also maintains responsibility for preparedness, response, and recovery from natural disasters. Implied with Homeland Security are homeland defense and the capabilities that the military services provide.

In the event of a domestic terrorist attack or domestic emergency, local governments (counties, cities, or towns) respond first using their own resources. First responders include but are not limited to local police, fire, emergency medical services, public health and medical providers, emergency management, and public works. When local jurisdictions cannot meet incident response resource needs with their own resources or with help available from other local jurisdictions, they may ask the State for assistance from the State police, health agencies, transportation agencies, incident management teams, State Defense Forces (SDF), and the National Guard. If an incident is beyond the local and State capabilities, the Governor can seek Federal assistance.²⁰

SDF are state controlled military forces that cannot be called to federal service. SDF normally replace the State's ARNG units when they are unavailable such as during deployments. However, not every state employs SDFs. Unfortunately, first responders

like SDFs and some ARNG units lack the necessary or compatible equipment to integrate completely in homeland operations. For example, in a large scale mobilization to support a hurricane disaster in the Gulf of Mexico that involves the federal government's participation, first responders do not have secure radios, telephones, or video capabilities that federal officials have. Conversely, many federal forces are not equipped with equipment capable of being interoperable with state and local agencies. This imposes organizational limitations and does affect command and control.

When responding to a state crisis or disaster relief, historically ARNG units are providing humanitarian relief with water, food, and temporary shelter, they seldom have to resort to using force and their presence is usually enough to deter any civil unrest or pilfering. Rather than equipping states with significant numbers of armor, artillery, and attack helicopters, which are not needed in a domestic situation, Guard force packages should be structured to support more of a domestic security role with combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) to include military police, medical support, transportation units, logistic units, and chemical, biological and nuclear reconnaissance and decontamination units.²¹

To provide humanitarian relief, two items are critical; manpower and transportation. Transportation comes in a variety of different methods to include helicopters. The ARNG has nearly 40 percent of all Army aviation assets, but more importantly they have 40 percent of the Army's fleet of AH-64 Apache Helicopters. Forty percent of the Apache fleet equates to 192 aircraft (eight battalions) of the 600 total aircraft (twenty-five battalions). This is a substantial amount of attack aviation

assets when considering the deployment schedule for ARNG Apache battalions under ARFORGEN is once every five years.²²

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' November 24, 2008, memorandum reference to The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), presented 82 of the commission's 95 recommendations for further review and implementation by DoD.²³ He requested DoD assess the current distribution of Total Force capabilities to specifically identify existing capabilities from all components to fulfill civil support requirements and to rebalance, where appropriate, in order to better respond to domestic emergencies.²⁴ Secretary Gates also recommended a review of ARNG capabilities that are not required for its state mission. One possible implication of this might be the redistribution of attack aviation assets from the ARNG to the USAR or AC. In light of the previous discussion on ARNG state missions, an inherent risk in doing this would be the ARNG's inability to respond to a homeland defense and/or security mission with attack aviation. However, as recent domestic events have shown, there is a significantly greater need for more utility or lift aircraft to transport humanitarian supplies than a need for an attack platform.

In addition to Secretary Gate's November 24th memorandum, one of the four Defense Objectives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) is to prepare for and defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. One of these contingencies, also a noted challenge, is supporting a national response to attack on, or natural disaster in, the United States.²⁵ The challenge associate with DoD responding to an event within the United States is that it is almost always in a supporting role, as mentioned previously in discussion on domestic order of response. To increase

domestic response preparedness the QDR directs DoD to improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management forces. In doing so, DoD will lean heavily on the RC to provide their unique capabilities of responding in the homeland.²⁶

A corollary to both Secretary Gates' November 24th memorandum and the 2010 QDR is defining the RC's role and mission. Officials have recognized a need for new policies, however; the QDR does not specifically identify which role or mission the ARNG will fulfill.²⁷ Instead the QDR vaguely states that "some elements" of the RC, especially those with "high-demand skill sets," would be needed to fulfill requirements for which they are well suited.²⁸ Although the 2010 QDR did not offer a forward vision of the future for the RCs, it did pledge to conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the RC, including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces.²⁹

ARFORGEN

In 2006, the Army established the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, designed to effectively and efficiently provide combatant commanders with trained and ready forces to meet operational requirements.³⁰ Today, ARFORGEN is defined as the structured progression of unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units. These units are prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commander and other Army requirements.³¹

No matter 2006 or today, the ARFORGEN concept is a systematic process generating unit readiness for AC and RC units and in theory establishing a balance among units. However, for nearly a decade, the Army has been operating at an

exhausting pace. High operational demands have stressed our ability to supply trained and ready forces during most of this period. The result was an Army out of balance,³² lacking strategic flexibility to respond to other contingencies.³³

The Army's plan to restore balance to the force is focused in four imperatives – Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform – expressed by General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The process, in part, to reaching this balance is to reinvest and abide by the ARFORGEN process. Since this new initiative, the current ARFORGEN model is working relatively well for AC units, specifically for Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) but struggles to meet the SECDEF's goal of deploying reservists for one year out of every six years.³⁴ The current model, however, due to continued stress on the force, cannot even attain its goal of one year deployed in every five years. "The interim objective is to achieve and then maintain a dwell³⁵ time of at least two years at home for every year deployed for the AC and four years at home for every year mobilized for the RC Soldier."³⁶

The first year of the ARFORGEN's cycle is set aside so returning units can recover equipment and personnel from deployment. Years two through four are for individual and collective training, but the units can be deployed to satisfy overseas contingencies and if required for homeland defense. During year five, the unit enters the Available force pool based on senior commander approval of unit commander assessment or as directed to deploy or transition.³⁷ The model is not yet reliable because it does not account for theater surge requirements, does not effectively handle dual-role requirements of the Guard, does not consider unavailable units due to new equipment fielding, and does not account for non-available personnel in units scheduled

to deploy. A result of unavailable Guard personnel necessitates cross-leveling of personnel between units. In many cases this degrades unit readiness and forces Guard members to be involuntarily deployed more often than the ARFORGEN model requires.

With an increased emphasis by the SECDEF, the rebalancing initiative will eventually align resources across both components. Additionally, as the Army continues to transform the RC into an “Operational Reserve” the initiative will ensure that force capabilities are balanced in accordance with SECDEF’s guidance while meeting Combatant Commander’s requirements.³⁸ Transformation of the RC implies one very important fact; “Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the Active Force.”³⁹ Assisted by Congress by fully funding this request will surely increase RC readiness. However, as mentioned earlier, this new policy does not identify which role or mission the ARNG will fulfill or what equipment is needed.

While there has naturally been a systemic focus to support OIF and OEF deployments through the ARFORGEN model, not until recently have we focused on homeland defense. A new ARFORGEN concept introduced at the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition on October 25, 2010, engages all units not locked into a deployment date to become part of a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF). Upon entering the Available force pool, a unit may be a CEF with a mission to accrue full spectrum capabilities in order to react to a global contingency.⁴⁰ CEFs are units that do not have a “return date” to theater operations identified or when not responding to other global contingencies will perform various missions including: homeland defense and civil support; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and

Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Forces; and Global Response Forces among others. Principally, the ARNG is structured for such a mission; however, due to frequent federal call-ups or lack of equipment, the ARNG may not be able to respond timely or effectively.

Equipping the ARNG

The multifaceted ARFORGEN model highlights a problem with the Guard's equipment shortfalls and older equipment to satisfy mission requirements. Since the Cold War and until recently, the Army followed a policy of tiered readiness that included a "first to fight" policy. The old tiered system, leaders recognized that fiscal reality made it impossible to resource all units at 100 percent across the Army. The tiered system managed limited resources by fully funding only the highest tier units; those lower in priority received funding for only a percentage of their requirements, creating a world of "have's" and "have not's," even in the AC force. Risk was assumed for the less resourced units that deployed later to support theater requirements. Under tiered readiness, virtually all units in the Army National Guard received considerably less funding than their AC counterparts, creating an entire component of "have not's." "This resulted in steeply tiered readiness, with many units being unready for deployment with significant post-mobilization training and equipping."⁴¹ This construct acknowledges the RC role as a strategic reserve that was not expected to participate in the early stages of a conflict, and prioritized resources accordingly. The onset to change the RC to an operational force has made tiered readiness obsolete.

Additionally, the Total Force concept equipping approach was designed for "cascading modernization" or providing "hand-me-downs" to the RC. Generally, the

reserves received the old equipment from AC when the AC received newly fielded equipment. Consequently, RC units with older equipment were encumbered with higher maintenance costs, lower equipment availability rates, and overall had less capability than their modernized AC counterparts.⁴²

Based upon these Cold War equipping principles, Army National Guard units were “typically provided from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime mission”⁴³ and, because of their late deployment timeline, were expected to have the time to receive and train on the contingency-specific mission-essential equipment prior to deploying.⁴⁴ When RC units were confronted with the relatively short notice deployments, these shortages were made-up by cross leveling available equipment within the ARNG.

Currently, with the implementation of Directive #1200.17 directing the RC to become an operational force, the RC is equipped in accordance with an Army-wide, integrated equipping strategy. This ensures that AC and RC units are equipped to the same levels of modular organization and equipment modernization in accordance with the ARFORGEN process.⁴⁵ Moreover, and to better justify transforming to an operational force, recent missions of the ARNG highlight the need to provide critical dual-use (CDU) equipment to the Guard that can be used in all of its mission areas, from domestic disaster response to warfighting. To support the Guard’s core competencies in domestic emergencies,⁴⁶ ARNG leadership identified the “Essential 10” equipment needs, which aviation is one.⁴⁷ The emphasis on CDU equipment is vital to Guard modernization because it means that troops will train and deploy with the same equipment for both domestic and overseas missions. Lack of required equipment

prevents non-deploying ARNG units from conducting important training and also limits their ability to respond to Homeland missions.

A paradigm to commit resources to the meet the demands of the ARNG so they receive an adequate supply of equipment, proper mix of capabilities, and most recent technologies is provided in Department of Defense Directive #1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005. The policy states:

The Reserve components of each Military Department shall be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions and shall have an equipment procurement and distribution program that is responsive to the Combatant Commanders' mission requirements and sustainable on those joint and other missions, including homeland defense. The Department of Defense's goal is to fill the mission equipment requirements of the Reserve components in accordance with the Total Force Policy.

With the implementation of Directives #1200.7 and #1225.6, among other imperatives, implied is having the appropriate funding available. The robust supplemental funding bills received for operations in OIF and OEF have covered most combat losses, and even enabled the Army to make some headway on equipment upgrades and modernization. Although, there still exists a small propensity to “rob Peter to pay Paul” in regards to backfilling equipment in the event of a combat loss, the Army attempts to segregate equipment between AC and RC. If an AC unit lost the equipment the first analysis to provide the backfill is the AC and vice versa for the RC. However, there have been times that the Army has had to transfer equipment between the AC and RC when they could not backfill their own loss.⁴⁸ This is another example where Directive #1225.6 helps replenish equipment to the ARNG, or there is a plan to replace the equipment:

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall provide status reports on equipment withdrawn and diverted under delegated authority to the ASD(RA) within 90 days of the withdrawal or diversion. The status report

must address plans to replace the equipment in the units from which it was withdrawn or diverted and to provide training sets of equipment to support annual training readiness requirements. If the equipment is to remain in the theater of operations, then the status report must address plans to replace the equipment in units returning home to ensure readiness training.⁴⁹

Complicating this system even further within Army aviation are the cancellations of new start programs like the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) and other on-going modernization efforts. The ARH was the new reconnaissance helicopter platform designed to replace the aging OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) to include modernizing four ARNG AH-64A model battalions that were transitioning to reconnaissance units. The ARNG battalions were scheduled to field the new ARH simultaneously with the AC beginning in FY10. Due to the ARH cancellation in October 2008,⁵⁰ the Army made the decision to modernize the four ARNG battalions with cascaded AH-64D models from the AC as the AH-64D Block II and Block III upgrades became available. The AC OH-58D units will maintain their aircraft while performance and system improvements are fielded between FY14 and FY18.

The challenge in equipping the ARNG and satisfying ARFORGEN is timing. The AH-64D Block II and Block III upgrades are from remanufactured AH-64A models. Meaning, once an A model is turned in, approximately fourteen months later it is returned to the Army as a Block II or Block III D model. Additionally, the remanufactured Apaches will not be fielded to the four A model ARNG until beginning FY11 through FY14, taking between eight and fifteen months for each battalion to completely field the new aircraft, sequentially. The delay in fielding has a direct impact on the ARNG units conducting training and their availability to fulfill ARFORGEN requirements.

Army aviation continues to modernize while sustaining a high operational pace. The demand in theater for aircraft will continue to grow; “Vertical lift has been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.”⁵¹ The demand for more rotary-wing capacity will also affect delivery of cascaded and reset airframes to the AC and RC where there just isn’t enough to satisfy the demand. Meanwhile, the ARNG rotary wing fleet provides approximately 45 percent of the Army’s total aviation force for all missions and in certain key areas such as the widely used utility helicopters (UH/HH-60 and CH-47s), the ARNG possesses 44 percent and 45 percent respectively.⁵² In addition, when not mobilized, the ARNG aviation units are the most available and fastest responding aviation elements for critical first response missions in the homeland, where they are controlled by the State Governor.

Recommendations

There are certainly many policies that can be derived to determine the future of the RC. This paper basically arrives at two controversial points; ARNG’s current role and mission to support transforming to an operational force, and structuring Army aviation to best utilize assets. Both points can be considered a political minefield largely due to budget share at the federal and state level. Although the RC has contributed greatly, and will continue to be a vital part of the Total Army and the National Security Strategy, it is also clear that the Total Army concept was not intended for today’s current national security environment. This is especially true with the ARNG as they maintain fulfilling a dual state-federal requirement. The perfect opportunity to leverage Congress to completely adapt the ARNG to an operational force and provide the right balance of

rotary-wing assets to satisfy mission requirements without jeopardizing the ARFORGEN cycle is now.

With their dual mission the ARNG is perfectly suited to expand their role in homeland security. Some units have already assumed duties in this area and are trained and ready. My recommendation is by far, easier to plan than it will be to implement due to numerous political issues at federal and state levels. I propose a change so that the RC mission is clearly delineated between the Army Reserve and the National Guard to focus efforts and resources. I would assign the Army Reserve the sole mission that they are intended for; providing the AC a complementary and supplemental augmentation. The USAR is the “federal reserve force” and requires no consideration of state politics for its use. I would furthermore assign the National Guard the primary mission of homeland security and domestic support, for which they are intended for; “to provide for calling forth of the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”⁵³ Only in an extreme case such as total war should they back-up the AC in full spectrum operations. This proposal will provide the Army with a flexible and effective response force when the national interest calls for either homeland security needs or for full-spectrum operations. This proposal may require the transfer of units and more than likely the transfer of personnel between the two components, but this is a topic for another paper. The ultimate goal would be an efficient distribution of combat and combat support equipment among the components to satisfy demand.

Furthermore, I recommend a change to Army aviation force structure in regards to equipment distribution. Specifically, removing some AH-64 Apache helicopters from

the ARNG, and replacing them with utility helicopters will better structure them for Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and when needed for other Title 10 operations. This is a better solution to adequately support the ARNG's dual-role mission, properly manage an expensive and highly demanded asset (AH-64D Apache), and it provides additional Active Component attack assets to support the ARFORGEN requirements.

Lastly I recommend no change in concept of operationalizing both the Army Reserve and the National Guard. My proposal to change the RC is only in how the Reserve and Guard should be utilized and organized to support this change. Providing 100 percent of required equipment is the right decision and the current policy movement to an operational force is feasible. However, the procuring equipment and long-term readiness of the RC as an operational force is at risk while Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding is subsidizing it. This is a practice that must be changed because of the need to cut costs due to the current economic and fiscal situation.

Recently Secretary Gates has presented a \$78 billion reduction in the 2012 budget to take effect over the next five years.⁵⁴ This is the first planned budget reduction to military spending since 2003. The Secretary's efficiency initiative will cut spending on extraneous operating expenses and reinvest some of the savings into modernization initiatives. Moving the funding from OCO into the base budget technically does not produce any savings, but it aligns with Secretary Gates' efficiency initiative.

Conclusion

The Total Force demands for the war on terror have become overbearing, specifically for Army aviation. OIF and OEF are the first extended U.S. military

campaigns since the end of the Cold War. The all-volunteer military has been stretched towards its limit and mandated large scale activation of the reserves to relieve pressure on the active force. As a result, the National Guard stands at a decisive point in its evolution, transitioning to an operational reserve for the first time in its 370 year history.

This opportunity to change is filled with challenges but the necessity for policy transformation is clear. The change I propose offers an opportunity for the RC to be vigilant and focused on mission and provides more equipment to assist in fulfilling its new operational role.

Also without proper funding and continued Congressional oversight and support, ARNG transition requirements may fall short; it will remain a slow and arduous process while at war. Rebalancing, modularity and modernization will still have many tasks to fulfill. Though all participants are currently engaged in this capacity and the willingness to complete transformation to an operational force, future cancellation of acquisition programs, redistributing of budget or cancellation of supplemental funding will drastically impact efforts. Whatever the outcome, the decision to operationalize the RC was a correct one. The RC will continue to play a pivotal role in protecting Americans at home and abroad in many years to come and will need to the right mix of equipment for the task.

Endnotes

¹ Boston Globe National News, "Army Is Worn Too Thin, Says General," http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/09/27/army_is_worn_too_thin_says_general/ (accessed December 28, 2010).

² U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," DoD Directive #1200.17 (Washington, DC: October 29, 2008).

³ Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, "Executive summary," in National Guard Bureau, "2007 National Guard Posture Statement" (Washington, DC: November 8, 2006), 2.

⁴ "ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and readiness strategy that synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization and resourcing to generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces tailored to Joint mission requirements. The RESET, TRAIN/READY, AND AVAILABLE force pools provide the framework for the structured progression of increased readiness in ARFORGEN. The Army will use these force pools in addition to mission requirements to prioritize resources over time and synchronize unit manning, equipping, resourcing, and training." *How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 2009-2010, 27th Edition, National Defense Act of 1916, 16.

⁵ History of the National Guard, The Making of a New Nation, <http://www.usmilitary.about.com/od/guardandreserve/a/anghistory.htm> (accessed February 24, 2011).

⁶ Personnel End Strength – July 2010, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/end-strength.htm> (accessed February 24, 2011).

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual No.1, *The Army*, 14 June 2001, 21.

⁸ U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8.

⁹ William M. Donnelly, "The Root Reforms and the National Guard," *US Army Center of Military History*, <http://www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-NG.htm> (accessed February 24, 2011).

¹⁰ *How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 2009-2010, 27th Edition, National Defense Act of 1916, 101.

¹¹ Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume 2*, 57, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh-v2/amh%20v2/chapter2.htm> (accessed February 27, 2011).

¹² *How the Army Runs - The Operational "Ready Reserve": 1970's-2009*, 116.

¹³ History of the National Guard, The "Total Force" Goes to War, http://www.usmilitary.about.com/od/guardandreserve/a/anghistory_4.htm (accessed February 24, 2011).

¹⁴ National Guard, *About the National Guard*, <http://www.ng.mil/About/default.aspx> (accessed February 24, 2011).

¹⁵ Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume 1*, 374, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh-v1/index.htm#HTML> (accessed February 27, 2011).

¹⁶ U.S. Army Reserve – History, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar-history.htm> (accessed February 24, 2011).

¹⁷ Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/> (accessed December 30, 2010).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency Home Page, *Overview Document, Key Players, National Response Framework Resource Center*, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2011), 2.

²¹ General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, "Organizing the United States Government to Effectively Protect America's Homeland Against Terrorism," Testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Washington, D.C: 12 October 2001).

²² How the Army Runs - Force Management/Force Generation, 116.

²³ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, (Washington, DC: November 24, 2008).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 15.

²⁶ Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR), *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: CNGR, January 31, 2008), 6.

²⁷ "The Reserve Component plays a vital role in meeting our defense missions and in enabling us to manage stress on the active force. In short, we could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces. I applaud the QDR report's commitment to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Reserve Component policies. In that review, it is important that we consider the proper balance of maintaining the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force." Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff, "Chairman's Assessment of the 2010 QDR, Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 102.

²⁸ Ibid., 53.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Secretary Pete Geren and GEN George W. Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009, Addendum E – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)*, Army Posture Statement presented to the 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2009).

³¹ Secretary John M. McHugh and GEN George W. Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Addendum F – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)*, presented to the 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 2011).

³² Unbalance is also referred to as a product of stress from persistent shortfalls and the need for involuntary mobilizations, while preserving Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS) capabilities. McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Information Papers - Active Component Reserve Component Rebalance*.

³³ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011*, 2.

³⁴ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Utilization of the Total Force,” *Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense* (Washington, DC: January 19, 2008). McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011*, 3.

³⁵ Dwell is the term used to describe the time when Soldiers and units are in the RESET and Train/Ready force pools, respectively.

³⁶ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011*, 4.

³⁷ Geren and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009, Addendum E – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)*.

³⁸ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Information Papers - Active Component Reserve Component Rebalance*, 2.

³⁹ John A. Nagl and Travis Sharp, “Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (4th quarter 2010), 22.

⁴⁰ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Addendum F – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)*.

⁴¹ James Jay Carafano, “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future,” *Heritage Lectures* no. 869 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, December 2005), 10.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005), 12.

⁴⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost is Uncertain* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2008), 8.

⁴⁵ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Information Papers - Equipping the Reserve Component*.

⁴⁶ James Jay Carafano, “Shaping the 21st Century Role of the National Guard and Reserves,” May 4, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Shaping-the-21st-Century-Role-of-the-National-Guard-and-Reserves> (assessed March 6, 2011).

⁴⁷ National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison, "FY09 National Guard "Essential 10" Equipment Requirements," February 26, 2008, <http://www.roa.org/site/DocServer/essential10.pdf> (assessed March 6, 2011).

⁴⁸ Personal knowledge and experience of the author when assigned as the Attack/Reconnaissance Helicopter Action Officer for HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Directorate (DAMO-AV), 2009-2010.

⁴⁹ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," DoD Directive #1225.6 (Washington, DC: April 7, 2005), 3.

⁵⁰ "DOD Announces Non-Certification of Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Program," October 16, 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12288> (assessed March 6, 2011).

⁵¹ McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011*, 21.

⁵² Percentages were extrapolated from McHugh and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, Information Papers – ARNG Rotary Wing and Unmanned Aircraft*.

⁵³ U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8.

⁵⁴ Travis Sharp, "The Sacrifice Ahead: The 2012 Defense Budget," Center for a New American Security, Policy Brief, February 14, 2011, 1, http://cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_DefenseBudget_Sharp_3.pdf (assessed March 6, 2011).